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POLICE-SUSPECT INTERVIEWS  
Kate Haworth 
Police interviews with suspects are a unique form of institutional discourse with a highly 
significant social function. Yet they have been the subject of surprisingly little attention from 
a specifically pragmatic perspective. Nevertheless, several pragmatic concepts are of 
relevance and interest in this context. 
 
The power dynamics of the police-suspect interview have been a site of particular research 
interest (Harris 1984, 1989, 1995; Haworth 2006; Heydon 2003, 2005; Newbury & Johnson 
2006; Thornborrow 2002; see also Shuy 1998: 174-85). This has largely focused on the 
asymmetric power dynamic created by the discursive roles of questioner and responder 
allocated to participants. Yet it has also revealed that, despite the inherent institutional power 
of the police interviewer, the discursive dynamics are not completely one-sided, especially 
since the institutional purpose of the interview is to obtain information (and indeed evidence) 
from the mouth of the interviewee. Special attention has been paid to the question types 
utilised by interviewers and their pragmatic function (Harris 1984; Haworth 2006; Newbury 
& Johnson 2006; see also Johnson (2002) on the pragmatic implications of ‘so’-prefaced 
questions), and to discursive strategies of resistance utilised by interviewees (Harris 1989; 
Haworth 2006; Newbury & Johnson 2006). However, given the institutional purpose of the 
interview such resistance may be discursively successful but ultimately damaging to the 
interviewee’s legal position (Haworth 2006), and overall the literature demonstrates that 
power and control ultimately always remain with the interviewer.  
 
In a study of a different manifestation of power relations in the police-suspect interview, 
Ainsworth (1993) analyses the invocation of suspects’ rights during U.S. police 
interrogations as performative speech acts. Focusing on the right to consult a lawyer, she 
highlights that legal doctrine requires ‘direct and unqualified assertions’ of these rights in 
order for them to have legal effect (262). Due to strict principles of interpretation applied by 
the courts which run entirely counter to pragmatic models of communication, Ainsworth 
demonstrates (302ff.) that the use of ambiguous language, implicature, or even hedges can 
be sufficient to deprive interviewees of basic legal rights, despite the clear intended (if not 
literal) meaning of their utterance.  
 
Shuy (1998) also uses pragmatic concepts to reveal injustices in U.S. police interrogations, 
considering in some depth the speech act of confession. He observes that ‘most confessions 
are not made up of relatively clear and unambiguous performatives … Instead, confessions 
are often pieced together by means of an interrogation by law enforcement officers’ and are 
thus ‘dialogically constructed’ (9). He provides a number of case studies in which he was 
involved as a linguistic expert, and where this process of dialogic construction led to flawed 
confession statements. 
 
In the U.K., police-suspect interviews have a significant dual function, being both 
investigative and evidential. In addition to their original interview-room setting as part of the 
initial police investigation, interview data are subsequently transcribed and presented as 
evidence to judge and jury in court. This future evidential function of the interaction, and its 
consequent recontextualisation in the courtroom, have several important interactional 
consequences. 
 
Firstly, this means that interviewers’ turns often have the function of eliciting – indeed 
creating – specific pieces of evidence in the form of interviewees’ responses. This is 
especially important in establishing the mens rea, or ‘mental’ element of an offence, such as 
intention or knowledge. This needs to be established explicitly and unambiguously in order 
to be legally robust, leading to communicatively superfluous requests for explicit accounts 
of an interviewee’s state of mind even when already apparent by implication (referred to by 
Stokoe & Edwards 2008 as ‘silly questions’).  
 
Secondly, the evidential requirement for explicitness leads to difficulties with context-
dependent language such as deixis, used in the interview room but then recontextualised into 
the courtroom, whereby its intended point of reference becomes lost (Haworth 2009 
forthcoming). The use by interviewees of context-dependent and under-determined language 
often leads to repairs from interviewers who are more oriented to the future context and 
function of the utterances. But it is also still used by interviewers, indicating the difficulty of 
maintaining the needs of multiple contexts and audiences for utterances simultaneously 
(Haworth 2009 forthcoming). 
 
A further important concept in the U.K. police-suspect interview context is the inferential 
meaning of silence. Despite the so-called ‘right of silence’, section 34 of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 states that if, on being questioned, a suspect fails to mention a 
‘fact’, and this fact is later relied upon as part of their defence, the court is entitled to ‘draw 
inferences’ as to why they did not mention this sooner. The nature of these inferences is not 
specified, but the clear implication is that silence, or rather the absence of a (legally) effective 
response to a police question, can be taken as a sign of guilt. This arguably gives legal effect 
to the usual inferential meaning accorded to the absence of an explanation or denial in the 
face of an accusation. Yet prior to the introduction of this provision, such inferences were not 
legally permitted to be drawn. 
 However, despite legal references to the ‘right of silence’, in interviews where that right is 
asserted there is generally very little actual silence, with most interviewees still conforming to 
the expected interview format by supplying some form of verbal answer, often in the form of 
the formulaic ‘no comment’. This can be seen as to some extent still co-operative, in that it 
provides at least some response to the question, as well as functioning as a formal invocation 
of the interviewee’s rights.  
 
As a final general point, it should be borne in mind that the institutional function of police-
suspect interviews and the procedures involved can vary considerably between different legal 
jurisdictions. The goal orientation of the interview will therefore be slightly different (e.g. the 
preparation of a written monologic summary in Holland (Komter 2002), cf. the direct 
creation of verbal evidence in the U.K.), with inevitable interactional consequences. Further, 
police-suspect interviews have a different institutional goal to the police-witness interview; 
an important functional distinction which is often overlooked. 
 
See also: Ambiguity; context; deixis; explicit/implicit distinction; implicature; inference; 
institutional and professional discourse; legal pragmatics; performative pragmatics; 
performativity; power; question; silence; speech act theory; speech act type 
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